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Unit cohesion is a military concept, defined by one former United States Chief of staff in the early 1980s as "the bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, the unit, and mission accomplishment, despite combat or mission stress".〔"Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry, Fred Manning, (p.4 ) in ''Military Psychiatry: Preparing in Peace for War'', ISBN 0-16-059132-5; Manning cites Meyer, EC, "The unit", ''Defense'', 1982;82(February):1-9 〕 However the concept lacks a consensus definition among military analysts, sociologists and psychologists.〔Brian Palmer (2010), ("Pentagon Sees Little Risk in Allowing Gay Men and Women to Serve Openly" ) Slate (magazine), Dec. 1, 2010〕 ==History== Unit cohesion is a military concept dating back to at least Carl von Clausewitz, if not to antiquity. Several scholars have cited the influence of Sigmund Freud's thinking on theories of unit cohesion.〔〔"Why soldiers fight. Part I. Leadership, cohesion and fighter spirit." Robert B. Smith, 1983, ''Quality & Quantity'', Volume 18, Number 1, 1–32, 〕 A number of them noted that Freud wrote of cohesion breakdown among soldiers, asserting that it leads to panic, insubordination, self-interested rather than cooperative reactions to threats, and "a gigantic and senseless dread".〔Sigmund Freud (1922). ''Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego''. (Chapter V. Two Artificial Groups: The Church and the Army )〕 The later development of the concept is strongly informed by the work of Morris Janowitz, who, with Edward Shils, began writing on the topic in the late 1940s.〔Giuseppe Caforio, , ''Handbook of the Sociology of the Military'', (p.63 ), Springer, 2006. ISBN 0-387-32456-9. "The first attempt to establish a theory of cohesion and effectiveness within combat troops belongs to Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz (Shils and Janowitz, 1948). ..."〕 Janowitiz continued to work in this area in his sociological work, as the disruptive policy of frequently rotating individual soldiers and officers during the Vietnam War came under scrutiny as a large factor behind low morale.〔Milam, John R. (2009). ''Not a gentleman's war: an inside view of junior officers in the Vietnam War'', (p. 142 ), UNC Press Books, ISBN 0-8078-3330-4〕 Following the studies of several World War II armies, sociologists concluded that comradely ties between small combat units is a decisive factor in providing good morale, cohesion, and organization framework. The defeat of the Western forces by the poorly equipped Chinese People's Liberation Army in the Korean War in 1950 further generated interest on the role of "human elements" on modern battlefields.〔George 1967, p. vii.〕 Although Western armies traditionally created ties between soldiers through informal means such as teamwork or shared hardships instilled by discipline,〔George 1967, p. 27.〕 the Chinese army relied on formal methods to assimilate recruits into their units.〔George 1967, p. 29.〕 The assimilation process involved features such as coercive persuasion, surveillance, and political control,〔George 1967, pp. 31–35.〕 while military ranks and physical punishments were abolished to allow closer relations between officers and soldiers.〔George 1967, pp. 36-38.〕 The stringent assimilation methods allowed the Chinese to create high morale and cohesion compared to the Western forces.〔George 1967, p. 5.〕 However, high casualty rates and the lack of modern equipment later resulted in a significant erosion of morale and cohesion as the Korean War dragged on.〔George 1967, p. 164.〕 One of the worst cases of this erosion was the partial disintegration of the Chinese army during the spring offensive in May 1951.〔George 1967, p. 195–196.〕 In the late 1980s, one researcher stated that, regardless of whether unit cohesion was an actual motivator or merely a stabilizer, what mattered was that unit cohesion "enhanced fighting power", because it reduced "combat inhibitors (stress, fear, isolation)" and promoted "esprit de corps, morale and teamwork".〔Roger Kaplan (1987). ("Army Unit Cohesion in Vietnam: A Bum Rap" ), U.S. Army War College.〕 Other research has, however, concluded that there is value in distinguishing the components of social cohesion and "()ask cohesion ... the commitment to working together on a shared goal", since some studies conclude that unit effectiveness correlates strongly with task cohesion, not with social cohesion.〔 This debate about the relative importance, or even need for, the concepts of social cohesion and task cohesion is exemplified by an exchange between Anthony King and Guy Siebold in the journal ''Armed Forces & Society'' in 2006–2007.〔Anthony King, "The Word of Command: Communication and Cohesion in the Military," ''Armed Forces and Society 32'', 4 (2006): 493–512; Guy L. Siebold, "The Essence of Military Group Cohesion," ''Armed Forces and Society'' 33, 2 (2007), 286–295; Anthony King, "The Existence of Group Cohesion in the Armed Forces: A Response to Guy Siebold," ''Armed Forces and Society'' 33, 4 (2007): 638–645.〕 One U.S. military researcher has drawn a distinction between teamwork and unit cohesion—claiming teamwork as being merely "collaboration", while unit cohesion involves a bond that can sustain mutual commitment, not just to the mission, but to each other, and to the group as a whole. This added bond, he argued, enabled teamwork under conditions under which an organization might otherwise break down.〔van Epps (2008-12-31), ("Relooking Unit Cohesion: A sensemaking approach" ), ''Military Review''〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Unit cohesion」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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